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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The laws that determine who pays whom in the digital world were written, by and large, at a time 
when music was primarily performed via radio broadcasts or distributed through physical media (such as 
sheet music and phonograph records), and when each of these forms of music delivery represented a 
distinct channel with unique characteristics. With the emergence of the Internet, Congress updated some 
copyright laws in the 1990s. It applied one set of legal provisions to digital services it viewed as akin to 
radio broadcasts and another set to digital services it viewed as akin to physical media. Since that time 
consumers have increasingly been consuming music via digital services that incorporate attributes of 
both radio and physical media. However, companies that compete in enabling consumers to access 
music may face very different costs to license music, depending on the technology they use and the 
features they offer. These differences in technology and features also affect the amount of money 
received by songwriters, performers, music publishers, and record companies. 
U.S. copyright law allows performers and record labels to collectively designate an agent to receive 
payments and to negotiate the licensing fees that certain types of digital music services must pay to 
stream music to their customers. Groups representing public radio and educational stations reached 
voluntary agreements with the agent, SoundExchange, in 2015. Rates paid by parties that do not reach 
voluntary agreements with SoundExchange during a limited negotiation period are instead set by the 
Copyright Royalty Board (CRB), a panel of three judges appointed by the Librarian of Congress. 
On December 16, 2015, the CRB set rates for online music streaming services for the period 2016 through 
2020. For nonsubscription services, the CRB reduced the per-stream rate it had set in the previous rate 
proceeding, but the costs paid by several “small” music streaming services are likely to increase. 
Advocates of the small streaming services have launched a petition asking Congress to either allow their 
previous agreements to continue indefinitely or discontinue the requirement that small streaming services 
pay royalties to performers and record labels. SoundExchange has objected that the rates set by the CRB 
do not provide adequate compensation to performers and record labels. 
Members have introduced several bills in the 114th Congress that would change the amounts various 
participants in the music industry pay or receive in royalties. These bills are controversial, as they could 
alter the cost structures and revenues of broadcast radio stations, songwriters, performers, and others at 
a time when the music industry’s overall revenues are not growing. At the same time, the U.S. Department 
of Justice (DOJ) is continuing a review of consent decrees it entered into with music publishers in the 
1940s. The outcome could affect the extent to which songwriters can control the use of their works. 
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Summary 
Taylor Swift made headlines around the world when she pulled her entire catalog of recorded 
music from the digital steaming service Spotify in November 2014. She reportedly felt that 
Spotify devalued her music by making her entire albums available on its free service. As a 
songwriter, a composer, and a singer, Ms. Swift is entitled to get paid for (1) reproductions and 
public performances of the notes and lyrics she creates (the musical works), as well as (2) 
reproductions, distributions, and certain digital performances of the recorded sound of her voice 
combined with the instruments (the sound recordings). The amount Ms. Swift gets paid for her 
musical works and sound recordings depends on market forces, contracts among a variety of 
private-sector entities, and federal laws governing copyright and competition policy.  
The laws that determine who pays whom in the digital world were written, by and large, at a time 
when music was primarily performed via radio broadcasts or distributed through physical media 
(such as sheet music and phonograph records), and when each of these forms of music delivery 
represented a distinct channel with unique characteristics. With the emergence of the Internet, 
Congress updated some copyright laws in the 1990s. It applied one set of legal provisions to 
digital services it viewed as akin to radio broadcasts and another set to digital services it viewed 
as akin to physical media. Since that time consumers have increasingly been consuming music 
via digital services that incorporate attributes of both radio and physical media. However, 
companies that compete in enabling consumers to access music may face very different costs to 
license music, depending on the technology they use and the features they offer. These 
differences in technology and features also affect the amount of money received by songwriters, 
performers, music publishers, and record companies.  
U.S. copyright law allows performers and record labels to collectively designate an agent to 
receive payments and to negotiate the licensing fees that certain types of digital music services 
must pay to stream music to their customers. Groups representing public radio and educational 
stations reached voluntary agreements with the agent, SoundExchange, in 2015. Rates paid by 
parties that do not reach voluntary agreements with SoundExchange during a limited negotiation 
period are instead set by the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB), a panel of three judges appointed 
by the Librarian of Congress. 
On December 16, 2015, the CRB set rates for online music streaming services for the period 2016 
through 2020. For nonsubscription services, the CRB reduced the per-stream rate it had set in the 
previous rate proceeding, but the costs paid by several “small” music streaming services are 
likely to increase. Advocates of the small streaming services have launched a petition asking 
Congress to either allow their previous agreements to continue indefinitely or discontinue the 
requirement that small streaming services pay royalties to performers and record labels. 
SoundExchange has objected that the rates set by the CRB do not provide adequate compensation 
to performers and record labels. 
Members have introduced several bills in the 114th Congress that would change the amounts 
various participants in the music industry pay or receive in royalties. These bills are controversial, 
as they could alter the cost structures and revenues of broadcast radio stations, songwriters, 
performers, and others at a time when the music industry’s overall revenues are not growing. At 
the same time, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) is continuing a review of consent decrees it 
entered into with music publishers in the 1940s. The outcome could affect the extent to which 
songwriters can control the use of their works. 
Money for Something: Music Licensing in the 21st Century 
 
Congressional Research Service 
Contents 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
Overview of Legal Framework ....................................................................................................... 2 
Reproduction and Distribution Rights ....................................................................................... 2 
Public Performance Rights ........................................................................................................ 3 
Rights Required ......................................................................................................................... 3 
How the Industry Works .................................................................................................................. 4 
Songwriters and Music Publishers ............................................................................................ 4 
Recording Artists and Record Labels ........................................................................................ 6 
Music Licensees ........................................................................................................................ 7 
How Copyright Works ..................................................................................................................... 7 
Songwriters and Music Publishers ............................................................................................ 7 
Reproduction and Distribution Licenses (Mechanical Licenses) ........................................ 7 
Musical Work Public Performance Royalties ................................................................... 12 
Record Labels and Recording Artists ...................................................................................... 15 
Reproduction and Distribution Licenses ........................................................................... 15 
Sound Recording Public Performance Royalties .............................................................. 16 
Industry Developments and Issues ................................................................................................ 24 
“Interactive” Versus “Noninteractive” Music Services ........................................................... 24 
Free Versus Subscription Services and Sales of Music Downloads ........................................ 25 
Division of Royalty Payments ................................................................................................ 26 
Policy Developments and Issues ................................................................................................... 27 
ASCAP and BMI Consent Decree Reviews ............................................................................ 27 
Bills Introduced in the 114th Congress .................................................................................... 29 
 
Figures 
Figure 1. Trends in Consumer Spending on Music ......................................................................... 2 
Figure 2. U.S. Music Publishing Industry Revenue Trends ............................................................ 5 
Figure 3. Breakout of Music Publishers’ U.S. Revenues, by Type of Royalty .............................. 15 
  
Tables 
Table 1. Compulsory Royalty Rates for Mechanical Rights .......................................................... 11 
Table 2. Online Radio Services Owned/Operated by Selected Broadcast Radio Groups ............. 14 
Table 3. Royalty Rates Payable to Record Labels for Public Performance Rights ....................... 23 
  
Contacts 
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 30 
 
Money for Something: Music Licensing in the 21st Century 
 
Congressional Research Service 1 
Introduction 
Taylor Swift made headlines around the world when she, in conjunction with other holders of 
rights to her music, pulled her entire catalog of music from the digital steaming service Spotify in 
November 2014.1 As a songwriter, a composer, and a singer, Ms. Swift is entitled under federal 
law to get paid for (1) reproductions and performances of the notes and lyrics she creates (musical 
works), as well as (2) reproductions, distributions, and certain digital performances of the 
recorded sound of her voice combined with the instruments (sound recordings). Reportedly, 
Spotify and Ms. Swift reached an impasse when Spotify declined to prevent listeners to its free, 
advertising-supported service from accessing her music, while still making Ms. Swift’s music 
available to the paying subscribers of its Spotify Premium Service.2 
Yet Ms. Swift does not have total control over her music. For example, a version of her album 
1989 recorded by the artist Ryan Adams can be heard on Spotify, because her publisher, like some 
others, must make its music catalogs available pursuant to consent decrees with the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ). Thus, as a singer who owns the rights to her sound recordings, Ms. 
Swift can withdraw her own recorded music from Spotify, but as a songwriter she cannot dictate 
how the music service uses other recorded versions of her musical works. Other songwriters, 
however, including some who have co-written songs with Taylor Swift, do have this power, 
because their publishers are not subject to the consent decrees. 
The amount Ms. Swift gets paid for her musical works and sound recordings depends on market 
forces, contracts among a variety of private-sector entities, and federal laws governing copyright 
and competition policy. Congress wrote these laws, by and large, at a time when consumers 
primarily accessed music via radio broadcasts or physical media, such as sheet music and 
phonograph records, and when each medium offered consumers a distinct degree of control over 
which songs they could hear next. 
With the emergence of music distribution on the Internet, Congress updated some copyright laws 
in the 1990s. It attempted to strike a balance between combatting unauthorized use of copyrighted 
content—a practice some refer to as “piracy”—and protecting the revenue sources of the various 
players in the music industry. It applied one set of copyright provisions to digital services it 
viewed as akin to radio broadcasts, and another set of laws to digital services it viewed as akin to 
physical media. Since that time, however, music distribution has changed further, as online 
streaming of radio broadcasts and downloading of recorded albums have been joined by services 
that stream individual songs to subscribers under a variety of business models. The result, as the 
U.S. Copyright Office has noted, has been a “blurring of the traditional lines of exploitation.”3 In 
the meantime, the courts have been interpreting how to apply 20th-century copyright laws to a 
21st-century music marketplace. 
                                                 
1 Eric Pfanner and Takashi Mochizuki, “Sony Re-Evaluates Support for Free Music Streaming: Move Prompted by 
Swift Pulling Music from Spotify,” Wall Street Journal, November 14, 2014; Steve Knopper, “Spotify Founder to 
Taylor Swift: ‘Our Interests Are Totally Aligned with Yours,’” Rolling Stone, November 12, 2014, 
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/spotify-founder-to-taylor-swift-our-interests-are-totally-aligned-with-yours-
20141112.  
2 Andy Fixmer, “Taylor Swift Record Company Says Spotify Paid a Lot Less Than $6 Million,” Mashable, November 
12, 2014, http://mashable.com/2014/11/12/taylor-swift-spotify-payout/. 
3 Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights and Director et al., Copyright and the Music Marketplace, U.S. Copyright 
Office, February 2015, http://copyright.gov/docs/musiclicensingstudy/ (2015 U.S. Copyright Office Report), p. 25. 
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These controversies have arisen in an environment of declining consumer spending on music. 
Since 1999, when the Napster file-sharing service was introduced, annual spending on music by 
U.S. consumers, adjusted for inflation, has fallen by two-thirds (see Figure 1).4 Consumers are 
substituting the purchasing of albums and songs with the streaming of subscription and free 
online music services. Sorting out who is owed what money has become increasingly complex, 
and increasingly critical to performers, songwriters, record companies, and music publishers in a 
generally difficult business environment. 
Figure 1. Trends in Consumer Spending on Music 
 
Source: Recording Industry Association of America Shipment Database. 
Notes: Inflation adjustments based on U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index. Figures do not 
include consumer spending on live concerts. 
Overview of Legal Framework 
Under copyright law, creators of musical works, and artists who record them, have certain legal 
rights to their works. They typically license those rights to third parties, which, subject to 
contracts, may exercise the rights on behalf of the composer, songwriter, or performer. 
Reproduction and Distribution Rights 
Owners of musical works and owners of sound recordings possess, and may authorize others to 
exploit, several exclusive rights under the Copyright Act, including the following:5 
                                                 
4 John Seabrook, “Revenue Streams: Is Spotify the Music Industry’s Friend or Foe?,” The New Yorker, November 23, 
2014, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/11/24/revenue-streams. 
5 2015 Copyright Office Report, p. 25. Additional exclusive rights, a detailed description of which is beyond the scope 
of this report, include the right to create derivative works (e.g., a new work based on an existing composition) (17 
U.S.C. §106(2)) and the right to display the work publicly (e.g., by posting lyrics on a website) (17 U.S.C. §106(5)). 
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 the right to reproduce the work (e.g., make multiple copies of sheet music or 
digital files) (17 U.S.C. §106(1)) 
 the right to distribute copies of the work to the public by sale or rental (e.g., sell 
copies of sheet music in stores, or sell copies of digital files on iTunes or Google 
Play) (17 U.S.C. §106(3)) 
In the context of music publishing, the combination of reproduction and distribution rights is 
known as a “mechanical right.” This term dates back to the 1909 Copyright Law, when Congress 
required manufacturers of piano rolls to pay music publishing companies for the right to 
mechanically reproduce musical compositions.6 As a result, music publishers began issuing 
“mechanical licenses” to, and collecting mechanical royalties from, piano-roll manufacturers.7 
While the means of transmitting music have gone through numerous changes since, including the 
production of vinyl records, cassette tapes, and compact discs (CDs), the term “mechanical 
rights” has stuck. For sound recordings, reproductions and distribution rights apply only to 
recordings originally made permanent, or “fixed,”8 after February 15, 1972. Works that were 
fixed prior to this date are protected, if at all, pursuant to a patchwork of state laws and court 
cases.9 In 2015, the Recording Industry Association of America reached agreements with Pandora 
Media, Inc. (which operates the Pandora online music service) and Sirius XM Holdings Inc. 
(which operates the SiriusXM satellite service) on fees for their use of pre-1972 sound 
recordings.10 
Public Performance Rights 
The Copyright Act also gives owners of musical works and owners of sound recordings the right 
to “perform” works publicly (17 U.S.C. §106(4) and 17 U.S.C. §106(6), respectively). However, 
for sound recordings, this right applies only to digital audio transmissions. Examples of digital 
audio transmission services include the SiriusXM satellite service, the Music Choice cable 
network, and online streaming services such as Pandora and Spotify. 
Rights Required 
Who pays whom in the digital world depends in part on the means by which people consume 
music. Consumers of compact discs purchase the rights to listen to each song on the disc as often 
as they wish (in a private setting). Rights owners of sound recordings (record labels and artists) 
must pay music publishers for the right to reproduce their musical works in a physical format 
(such as a CD or vinyl record) or digital download.11 Retail outlets that sell CDs or digital files of 
                                                 
6 A video demonstration of a player piano and mechanical roll in action is available at YouTube, “I’ll See You in My 
Dreams—Lee Sims Piano Solo,” published on August 14, 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XauZT3GYbY8. 
7 Kevin Zimmerman, “Songwriter 101: Understanding Mechanical Royalties,” BMI, March 27, 2005. 
8 A fixed work is one “in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under 
the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. §101. Fixation is one of the many terms of art 
that the Copyright Act employs with meanings that differ from ordinary usage in everyday language.  
9 For an extensive discussion of lawsuits and state laws related to pre-1972 sound recordings, see CRS Report 
RL33631, Copyright Licensing in Music Distribution, Reproduction, and Public Performance, by Brian T. Yeh. 
10 “Pandora’s $90 Million Settlement on Pre-1972 Sound Recordings Has National Implications,” Warren’s 
Washington Internet Daily, October 26, 2015. 
11 Ari Herstand, “Why You Haven’t Been Getting Your iTunes Match Mechanical Royalties,” Digital Music News, 
October 14, 2014, http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2014/10/09/havent-getting-itunes-match-mechanical-royalties/. 
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sound recordings pay record labels for distribution rights, and the record labels in turn pay the 
music publishers fees based on retail sales.12 
Radio listeners have less control over when and where they listen to a song than they would if 
they purchased the song outright. The Copyright Act does not require broadcast radio stations to 
pay public performance royalties to record labels and artists, but it does require them to pay 
public performance royalties to music publishers and songwriters for notes and lyrics in broadcast 
music.13 As described below in “Broadcast Radio Exception,” Congress appears to have 
concluded in 1995 that the promotional value of broadcast radio airplay outweighs any revenue 
lost by record labels and artists. (See also “Webcaster Settlement Acts.”) 
Digital services need to pay record labels as well as music publishers for public performance 
rights. In practice, artists and record labels get most of the performance royalty from digital 
services, while music publishers and songwriters get only a small fraction.14 
Users of an “on demand,” or “interactive,” digital radio service can listen to songs upon request, 
an experience similar in some ways to playing a CD and in other ways to listening to a radio 
broadcast. To enable multiple listeners to select songs, the service reproduces digital files on its 
servers. It pays both reproduction royalties and performance royalties to music 
publishers/songwriters and to record labels/artists.15 
How the Industry Works 
From the viewpoint of copyright law, the music industry comprises three distinct groups of 
interests: (1) songwriters and music publishers; (2) recording artists and record labels; and (3) the 
music licensees who obtain the right to reproduce, distribute, or publicly perform music. 
Examples of music royalty payers include broadcast radio stations; music retailers; digital music 
streaming services; bars, restaurants, and general retailers; and concert venues and promoters. 
Songwriters and Music Publishers 
Music publishers work for songwriters and composers (referred to collectively as “songwriters” 
in this report). They are responsible for licensing the intellectual property of their clients and 
ensuring that royalties are collected. Songwriters often contract with publishing companies to 
administer their musical work copyrights. For example, as a songwriter and composer, Ms. Swift 
has a contract with a music publisher (Sony/ATV Music Publishing),16 with which she shares the 
rights to her musical works. 
Under agreements between a songwriter and a publisher, the publisher may pay an advance to the 
songwriter against future royalty collections to help finance the songwriter’s compositions. In 
                                                 
12 2015 Copyright Office Report, pp. 131-132. 
13 The rates may be based on a percentage of a radio station’s revenues or other factors, depending on terms set by the 
performing rights organizations.  
14 John Seabrook, “Revenue Streams: Is Spotify the Music Industry’s Friend or Foe?,” The New Yorker, November 23, 
2014, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/11/24/revenue-streams. 
15 Royalty Exchange, Mechanical and Performance Royalties: What’s the Difference, 
https://www.royaltyexchange.com/learn/mechanical-and-performance-royalties-whats-the-difference/; Harry Fox 
Agency, “Frequently Asked Questions: Digital Definitions,” https://www.harryfox.com/find_out/faq.php. 
16 Ben Sisaro, “Sony Threatens to Bypass Licensers in Royalties Battle,” New York Times, July 10, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/11/business/media/sony-threatens-to-bypass-licensers-in-royalties-battle.html?_r=0. 
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exchange, the songwriter assigns a portion of the copyright in the compositions he or she writes 
during the term of the contract.17 The publisher’s role is to monitor, promote, and generate 
revenues from the use of music in formats that require mechanical licensing rights, including 
sheet music, compact discs, digital downloads, ringtones, interactive streaming services, and 
broadcast radio.  
Songwriters and publishers derive royalty income at each step, but may need to share this income 
with sub-publishers and coauthors. For songwriters who are entering the music industry, the 
contract terms are generally standardized, with about a 50-50 division of income between the 
publisher and songwriter. In some cases a musical work has a single songwriter and publisher, so 
the division is relatively straightforward. Often, however, songs have multiple songwriters, each 
with his or her own publisher.18 (See also “ASCAP and BMI Consent Decree Reviews.”) 
Within the United States, the music publishing industry earned about $4.3 billion in revenues and 
$628.6 million in profits during 2015, according to IBIS, a research firm. Three firms account for 
about 37.4% of the publishing industry’s revenues: (1) Sony/ATV Music Publishing (19.2%), (2) 
Universal Music Publishing Group (12.2%), and (3) Warner Music Group (5.0%).19 After several 
years of growth, revenues of the music publishing industry declined between 2008 and 2010, and 
then stayed relatively flat (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2. U.S. Music Publishing Industry Revenue Trends 
 
Source: 2015 IBISWorld Music Publishing Report. 
Note: Figures not adjusted for inflation. 
                                                 
17 2015 Copyright Office Report, pp. 19-20. 
18 Ed Christman, “How ‘Shake It Off’ Ruled the Publishing Industry’s Fourth Quarter in 2014,” Billboard, February 
20, 2015, http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6480028/taylor-swift-shake-it-off-publishing-industry-fourth-
quarter-2014. 
19 Nick Paetrillo, “Music Publishing in the US—Getting a Remix: Digital Media Outlets Have Opened Up New 
Revenue Streams,” IBISWorld Industry Report 51223, October 2015, p. 4 (2015 IBISWorld Music Publishing Report). 
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IBIS predicts that over the next five years, as digital distribution becomes more prevalent, 
established songwriters may find it unnecessary to remain aligned with music publishers, and 
newer songwriters may be reluctant to sign long-term publishing contracts.20 
Recording Artists and Record Labels 
Record labels are responsible for finding musical talent, recording their work, and promoting the 
artists and their work. For example, as a performer, Ms. Swift has a contract with a record label 
(Big Machine Records, which has a partnership with Universal Music Group),21 with which she 
shares the rights to her sound recordings. 
Recording contracts (especially with the major labels—Sony Corporation, Warner Music Group, 
and Universal Music Group) generally require recording artists to transfer their copyrights to the 
record label for defined periods of time and defined geographic regions.22 In return, the recording 
artist receives a share of royalties from sales and licenses of the sound recording. Record 
companies also finance recordings of music, lend and advance artists funds for expenses, and 
attempt to guide the artists’ careers.23 The record companies earn most of their profits from sales 
of a relatively small number of hit recordings. 
Recording artists also work with independent producers to select material and a musical style.24 
Independent producers and independent labels often work with artists as subcontractors for major 
record companies under a variety of financial arrangements.25 Technological innovations have 
enabled producers to “play with” and reimagine songs, leading to a blurring of the lines between 
producers and traditional composers.26 For information about proposed legislation addressing 
how producers get compensated for their work, see “Bills Introduced in the 114th Congress.” 
The three major record labels earned about 42% of the industry’s revenues: (1) Sony Corporation 
(11.4%), (2) Universal Music Group (12.8%), and (3) Warner Music Group (17.5%).27 These 
                                                 
20 Ibid., p. 21. 
21 Ed Christman, “Taylor Swift’s Big Machine is Off the Market, Gets Republic Nashville,” Billboard, July 2, 2015. 
22 The question of whether or not recordings artists are “employees” of the labels, under the “work for hire” doctrine, 
and thereby sign over the rights to their music to the labels for 95 years after their initial release, instead of 35 years, 
has been the topic of considerable congressional debate. To the extent that sound recordings fall outside of the “work 
for hire” framework, recordings artists may terminate the assignment of their copyrights to the record labels. Melville 
B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, “Ch. 5.3 Works Made for Hire,” in Nimmer on Copyright: A Treatise on the Law of 
Literary, Musical, and Artistic Property, and the Protection of Ideas, vol. 1 (New York: M. Bender, 2015). See also 
Jon Pareles, “Musicians Take Copyright Issue to Congress,” New York Times, May 25, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/
2000/05/25/movies/musicians-take-copyright-issue-to-congress.html?pagewanted=all. 
23 Vogel, Entertainment Industry Economics, p. 280. 
24 For example, Madonna, for her album Rebel Heart, worked with multiple producers. In describing the recording 
process, Madonna said, “I didn’t know exactly what I signed on for, so a simple process became a very complex 
process. Everyone I worked with is tremendously talented, [but each producer] has also agreed to work with 5,000 
other people. I just had to get in where I could fit in.” Jon Pareles, “Madonna on ‘Rebel Heart,’ Her Fall, and More,” 
New York Times, March 5, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/06/arts/music/madonna-talks-about-rebel-heart-her-
fall-and-more.html?_r=0. 
25 For detailed descriptions of financial arrangements, see Vogel, Entertainment Industry Economics, pp. 280-281. 
26 See, for example, Taige Jensen, Graham Roberts, Alicia Desantis and Yulia Parshina Kottas, “Bieber, Diplo and 
Skrillex Make a Hit,” New York Times, August 25, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/video/arts/music/100000003872410/
bieber-diplo-and-skrillex-make-a-hit.html. The producers of “Where Are U Now,” recorded by Justin Bieber, also 
received writing credits. 
27 Nick Petrillo, “Major Music Label Production in the U.S., Low Note: The Internet Will Continue to Decrease Album 
Sales, Hurting Revenue,” IBISWorld Industry Report 51222, October 2015, p. 4 (2015 IBISWorld Major Label Music 
(continued...) 
Money for Something: Music Licensing in the 21st Century 
 
Congressional Research Service 7 
companies collectively earned about $6.9 billion in revenues and $397.8 million in profits from 
their recording businesses during 2015.28 While there are many smaller record labels, few are 
truly independent, because they often rely on larger record companies for initial financing, 
manufacturing (at least of CDs), and distribution of sound recordings.29 
Music Licensees 
A very large number of entities, from neighborhood bars to broadcast radio stations, “perform” 
copyrighted musical works for the public. Such entities must pay royalties to copyright holders. 
The types of royalty payments owed and the way those payments are determined vary 
considerably, depending mainly upon the way a particular entity is treated under copyright law. 
How Copyright Works 
Songwriters and Music Publishers 
Reproduction and Distribution Licenses (Mechanical Licenses) 
Congress passed the first federal copyright act in 1790.30 The act did not expressly protect 
musical compositions (“musical works”), but composers and songwriters could protect their 
works by registering them as “books.” In 1831 Congress amended the law to expressly protect 
musical works printed and sold as sheet music.31 With the 1909 Copyright Act, Congress added 
an exclusive right to make “mechanical” reproductions of songs in “phonorecords.”32 At the time, 
this exclusive right of mechanical reproduction applied to music in player pianos. 
By 1909, however, Congress was concerned about allegations that one player piano 
manufacturer—the Aeolian Company—was seeking to create a monopoly by buying up exclusive 
rights from music publishers.33 To address this concern, Congress established the first compulsory 
license in U.S. copyright law,34 requiring music publishers to make mechanical reproductions of 
their works available to all piano player manufacturers at 2 cents per “part manufactured,” 
regardless of how many piano rolls were actually sold. 
As technology developed, both mechanical rights and this rate of 2 cents per record subsequently 
applied to music distributed via vinyl records, cassette tapes, and compact discs. Prior to 
Congress’s adoption of the 1976 Copyright Act, the Register of Copyrights had proposed 
eliminating the compulsory license, but record companies, which pay music publishing 
companies for the right to reproduce the musical works in physical (and now digital) media, 
                                                                
(...continued) 
Production Report). In 2013 Sony acquired EMI Group’s publishing division in a partnership with private investors. 
28 Ibid., p. 4. 
29 Vogel, Entertainment Industry Economics, p. 281. 
30 Act of May 31, 1790, Ch. 15, Stat. 124. 
31 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, Ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436. 
32 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Patents, To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, committee 
print, 60th Cong., 2nd sess., February 22, 1909, Rep. 2222, pp. 6-8. 
33 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Patents, To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, committee 
print, 59th Cong., 2nd sess., March 2, 1907, Rep. 7083, Part 2, Views of the Minority, p. 5. 
34 2015 U.S. Copyright Office Report, p. 26. 
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opposed the proposal. They argued that recording artists needed unhampered access to musical 
material on nondiscriminatory terms, and that repeal would result in a great upheaval in the sound 
recording industry with no benefit to the public. The music publishers countered that the 
compulsory licensing scheme was no longer necessary to meet the antitrust problems that existed 
in 1909. While they much preferred outright repeal of a compulsory license, they were willing to 
compromise by accepting a higher royalty rate in lieu of repeal.35 
Congress ultimately concluded in 1976 that the compulsory licensing system was still warranted, 
but, based on the prevalence of records that offered multiple songs (i.e., albums), directed the 
Copyright Office to apply the rate on a per-song basis instead of a per-record basis.36 This 
enabled music publishers to earn more money from each record sale. Although Congress has 
amended the law several times, this compulsory license remains in effect today. In the Copyright 
Act of 1976, Congress recodified the compulsory license in 17 U.S.C. Section 115. The 1976 
Copyright Act raised the statutory rate, which had originally been set in 1909, from $0.02 per 
record37 to the greater of (a) $0.275 per song embedded in each record or (b) $0.005 cents per 
minute of playing time, or fraction thereof.38 The increase became effective on January 1, 1978. 
Congress also created a tribunal (consisting of five commissioners appointed by the President) to 
adjust the royalty rates thereafter.39 After replacing the tribunal with an arbitration panel in 1993, 
Congress established the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB) in 2004.40 
The CRB, which is composed of three administrative judges appointed by the Librarian of 
Congress, establishes the royalty rates that licensees pay publishers and songwriters for the 
mechanical rights to their works, unless such rates are voluntarily negotiated between a copyright 
owner and a user.41 The CRB sets rates every five years for Section 115 licenses, as required by 
the Copyright Act.42 While copyright owners and users are free to negotiate voluntary licenses 
that depart from the statutory rates and terms, the CRB‐set rate effectively acts as a ceiling for 
                                                 
35 U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision, committee print, 83rd Cong., 2nd sess., 
March 8, 1967, H.Rept. 90-183, pp. 66-67. 
36 Ibid., U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision, committee print, 94th Cong., 2nd 
sess., September 3, 1976, pp. 110-111. See also Scott Thill, “1948: Columbia’s Microgroove LP Makes Albums Sound 
Good,” Wired, June 10, 2010, http://www.wired.com/2010/06/0621first-lp-released/. 
37 Copyright Act of 1909, P.L. 60‐349, §1(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075‐76. 
38 Copyright Act of 1976, P.L. 94-553, §115(c)(2). 17 U.S.C. §115(c)(2). The report from the House Judiciary 
Committee stated that “While upon initial review it might be assumed that the rate established in 1909 would not be 
reasonable at the present time, the committee believes that an increase in the mechanical royalty must be justified on 
the basis of economic conditions and not on the mere passage of 67 years.” U.S. Congress, House Committee on the 
Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision, committee print, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., September 3, 1976, p. 111. 
39 P.L. 94-553, §§801-810. 
40 17 U.S.C. §§801-805; Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, P.L. 108-419. See also Copyright 
Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993, P.L. 103-198. 
41 17 U.S.C. §115(c)(3)(E)(i). Section 115 provides that voluntarily negotiated rates for mechanical licenses supersede 
those set by the CRB. 
42 17 U.S.C. §§801(b)(1) and 804(b)(4). 
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what the owner may charge.43 The CRB establishes rates for Section 115 licenses based on policy 
objectives set forth in Section 801(b)(1) of the 1976 Copyright Act.44  
In 1995, Congress enacted the Digital Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act 
(DPRSRA).45 Among other provisions, this act amended 17 U.S.C. §115 to expressly cover the 
reproduction and distribution of musical works by digital transmission (digital phonorecord 
deliveries, or DPDs).46 Congress directed that rates and terms for DPDs should distinguish 
between “(i) digital phonorecord deliveries where the reproduction or distribution of a 
phonorecord is incidental to the transmission which constitutes the digital phonorecord delivery, 
and (ii) digital phonorecord deliveries in general.”47 This distinction prompted an extensive 
debate about what constitutes an “incidental DPD.” For several years, the Copyright Office 
deferred moving forward on a rulemaking, urging that Congress resolve the matter. In July 2008 
the Copyright Office proposed new rules, determining that “[while] it seems unlikely that 
Congress will resolve these issues in the foreseeable future ... the Office believes resolution is 
crucial in order for the music industry to survive in the 21st Century.”48 
In November 2008, the Copyright Office, recognizing that streaming services make and store 
reproductions of musical works on computer servers to facilitate streaming, concluded that these 
services could utilize the Section 115 compulsory licensing process.49 The Copyright Office 
declined to specify whether the temporary reproductions of musical works were an interim step in 
public performances (making some streaming services akin to noninteractive digital services 
described in Section 112), or a reproduction and distribution that required mechanical licenses 
(making some streaming services akin to compact discs and permanent digital downloads).
 
In 2009 and again in 2013, the CRB established the statutory rates and terms that interactive 
streaming services must pay for mechanical licensing based on an agreement negotiated among 
representatives of music publishers and songwriters, record labels, and the streaming services.50  
The CRB rate proceedings for mechanical licenses are separate from those for public 
performance licenses. When Congress originally established compulsory license rate proceedings 
                                                 
43 According to the CRB, “virtually no one uses section 115 to license reproductions of musical works, yet the parties 
in this proceeding are willing to expend considerable time and expense to litigate its royalty rates and terms. The 
Judges are, therefore, seemingly tasked with setting rates and terms for a useless license. The testimony in this 
proceeding makes clear, however, that despite its disuse, the section 115 license exerts a ghost-in-the-attic like effect on 
all those who live below it.” Copyright Royalty Board, Library of Congress, “Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord 
Delivery Rate Determination Proceeding,” 74 Federal Register 4510, 4513, January, 26, 2009. 
44 These factors include (1) maximizing the availability of public works to the public, (2) affording copyright owners a 
fair return on their creative works and copyright users a fair income under existing economic conditions, (3) reflecting 
the relative contributions of the copyright owners and users in making products available to the public, and (4) 
minimizing any disruptive impact on the structure of the industries involved and on generally prevailing industry 
practices. 17 U.S.C. §801(b)(1). 
45 P.L. 104-39. 
46 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, 
committee print, 104th Cong., 1st sess., August 4, 1995, S.Rept. 104-128 (Washington: GPO, 1995), p. 10. 
47 17 U.S.C. §115(c)(3)(D). 
48 2008 NPRM, p. 40806. 
49 2008 Interim Rule, p. 66174. 
50 Copyright Royalty Board, Library of Congress, “Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Determination 
Proceeding,” 74 Federal Register 4510, January, 26, 2009; Copyright Royalty Board, Library of Congress, 
“Adjustment of Determination of Compulsory License Rates for Mechanical and Digital Phonorecords,” 78 Federal 
Register 67938, November 13, 2013. 
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in 1976, the House Judiciary Committee explained that it chose to stagger the various rate-setting 
proceedings in order to balance the workload of (what is now) the CRB.51  
Interactive streaming services, including Spotify, obtain both mechanical and privately negotiated 
public performance licenses (described in “Musical Work Public Performance Royalties”) for the 
musical works they use. Noninteractive services such as Pandora, however, do not pay 
mechanical royalties to music publishers. In its annual report for 2014, Pandora Media, Inc. stated 
the following: 
We do not currently pay so-called “mechanical royalties” to music publishers for the 
reproduction and distribution of musical works embodied in server copies or transitory 
copies used to make streams audible to our listeners. Although not currently a matter of 
dispute, if music publishers were to retreat from the publicly stated position of their trade 
association that non-interactive streaming does not require the payment of a mechanical 
royalties, and a court entered final judgment requiring that payment, our royalty 
obligations could increase significantly, which would increase our operating expenses 
and harm our business and financial conditions.
52
 
According to the Copyright Office, interactive streaming services represent only a small 
percentage of mechanical royalties received by music publishers.53 
Table 1 describes the rates that manufacturers and distributors of different types of media pay 
music publishers for mechanical rights. There are currently 17 distinct categories of media and 
services under the Section 115 license, each with its own specific rate. Under the current regime, 
at the outset of a rate-setting proceeding, parties must identify every “business model” that might 
be relevant in the next five years so the CRB can establish a rate for that use. The rates that 
interactive services pay the publishers are tied to the rates that the services pay record labels for 
mechanical rights, which are negotiated in the free market. According to National Music 
Publishers Association president David Israelite, “If they get a better deal, we get a better deal.”54 
                                                 
51 U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision, committee print, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 
September 3, 1976, 94-1476, p. 173. 
52 Pandora Media, Inc. 2014 SEC Form 10-K, p. 13. See also Spotify Ltd., “Spotify Explained, Royalties: in Detail,” 
http://www.spotifyartists.com/spotify-explained/#royalties-in-detail. 
53 2015 Copyright Office Report, p. 162. 
54 Ed Christman, “Copyright Royalty Board to Set Mechanical Royalty Rates for Digital Music Services,” Billboard, 
April 12, 2012, http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/publishing/1098005/copyright-royalty-board-to-set-
mechanical-royalty-rates-for. 
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Table 1. Compulsory Royalty Rates for Mechanical Rights 
Applies to Physical Media, Digital Download Services, Digital Interactive, Interactive Streaming 
Medium Description Amount Notes 
CDs, LPs, cassettes, and 
other recordings 
embodied in a physical 
medium 
Payable royalty is linked to 
the number of copies 
made and distributed  
$0.091 per song Songs > 5 minutes in length 
have a rate of $0.0175 per 
minute or fraction thereof. 
Record labels pay music 
publishers for these rights. 
Permanent digital 
downloads (e.g., iTunes) 
Payable royalty is linked to 
the number of copies 
made and distributed 
$0.091 per song Songs > 5 minutes in length 
have a rate of $0.0175 per 
minute or fraction thereof. 
Record labels pay music 
publishers for these rights. 
Ringtones Payable royalty is linked to 
the number of copies 
made and distributed 
$0.24 per ringtone Prior to 2006, music 
publishers negotiated for 
ringtone rates directly. 
Publishers introduced these 
rates to the CRB as 
benchmarks, resulting in 
higher rates for ringtones 
than for full-length songs. 
Record labels pay music 
publishers for these rights. 
Interactive subscription 
streaming services (e.g., 
Spotify’s $4.99/month 
service for personal 
computers only)  
A formula based on 
(1) an “all-in” royalty pool 
(payable to music 
publishers for 
performance and 
mechanical rights); 
(2) a calculation of the 
payable mechanical royalty 
pool (after deducting 
public performance 
royalties); 
(3) an allocation based on 
the total number of plays 
on the streaming service  
The total amount of 
royalties payable to music 
publishers is 
(1) at least 10.5% of the 
music service’s revenue;  
(2) tied to terms of 
negotiated agreements 
between interactive 
subscription streaming 
services and record labels 
Payments to each 
songwriter based on the 
total number of song’s 
monthly plays 
Formula adopted by CRB 
pursuant to 2008 and 2013 
settlements reached by 
trade associations 
representing music 
publishers, record labels, 
songwriters, and digital 
streaming services. Codified 
in 37 C.F.R. 385 (Subpart B). 
Streaming services pay music 
publishers for these rights. 
Free interactive 
nonsubscription, 
advertising-supported 
services (e.g., Spotify’s 
advertising-supported 
service) 
Same as above. Similar to above. Same as above. 
Source: 37 C.F.R. §§358.3(a)-(b), §§385.12-385.14, §385.23, Harry Fox Agency, “Rate Charts,” 
https://www.harryfox.com/find_out/rate_charts.html; 2015 Copyright Office Report, p. 30. Ari Herstand, “Why 
Exactly is Spotify Being Sued and What Does This Mean?,” Digital Music News, December 30, 2016, 
http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2015/12/30/why-exactly-is-spotify-being-sued-and-what-does-this-mean/. 
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In the United States, music publishers collect mechanical royalties from recorded music 
companies and streaming services via third-party administrators. The two major administrators 
are the Harry Fox Agency, a nonexclusive licensing agent, and Music Reports, Inc. After charging 
an administrative fee, these agencies distribute the mechanical royalties to the publishers, which 
in turn distribute them to songwriters. In September 2015, the performing rights organization 
Society of European Stage Authors and Composers (SESAC) acquired the Harry Fox Agency 
from the National Music Publishers Association trade organization.55 (For a description of 
SESAC and other performing rights organizations, see “Musical Work Public Performance 
Royalties.”) Music publishers may also directly issue and administer mechanical licenses 
themselves.56 
Musical Work Public Performance Royalties 
Depending on who collects public performance royalties on behalf of publishers and songwriters, 
the rates are either subject to oversight by the federal district courts in New York City or are 
based on marketplace negotiations between the publishers and licensees. 
Congress granted songwriters the exclusive right to publicly perform their works in 1897.57 While 
this right represents a way for copyright owners to profit from their musical works, the sheer 
number and fleeting nature of public performances make it impossible for copyright owners to 
individually negotiate with each user for every use, or detect every case of infringement.58 
Performing rights organizations (PROs) address the logistical issue of how to license and collect 
payment for public performances in a wide range of settings.59 The American Society of 
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) was formed in 1914, SESAC was founded in 1930, 
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) was founded in 1939, and Global Music Rights (GMR) was 
established in 2013. After charging an administrative fee, the PROs split the public performance 
royalties among the publishers and songwriters. 
In contrast to the mechanical right, the public performance of musical works is not bound by 
compulsory licensing under the Copyright Act. As described in “ASCAP and BMI Consent 
Decree Reviews,” ASCAP and BMI are subject to government antitrust regulation through long-
standing consent decrees. Music publishers may affiliate with multiple PROs; songwriters, 
however, may choose only one.60 
Entities that “publicly perform” a musical work—including terrestrial, satellite and Internet radio 
stations, broadcast and cable television stations, online services, bars, restaurants, and live 
                                                 
55 The purchase enabled SESAC to become the first organization to handle both performing and mechanical licenses, 
giving it an advantage over rivals BMI and ASCAP. Nate Rau, “SESAC Shows the Way for Music Licensing, Music 
Row Land Use,” The Tennessean, August 14, 2015, http://www.tennessean.com/story/entertainment/music/2015/08/14/
sesac-shows-way-music-licensing-music-row-land-use/31742119/. 
56 2015 Copyright Office Report, p. 21. 
57 Act of March 3, 1897, Ch. 392, 29 Stat. 694. See also 2015 U.S. Copyright Office Report, p. 17. Congress declined 
to grant exclusive performance rights when it first amended copyright law to expressly protect musical works in 1831, 
because it considered performances as promotional vehicles to spur sales of sheet music. 2015 U.S. Copyright Office 
Report, p. 17. 
58 Broadcast Music, Inc., et al. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., et al., 441 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1979); see also Alden-
Rochelle, Inc., et al. v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers et al., F. Supp. 888, 891 (S.D.N.Y. 
1948). 
59 Ibid. and 2015 Copyright Office Report, p. 20. 
60 SESAC, “FAQs: Becoming a SESAC Affiliate,” http://www.sesac.com/WritersPublishers/faq.aspx. 
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performance venues—may obtain a license from a songwriter or publisher through a PRO.61 Most 
commonly, licensees obtain a blanket license, which allows the licensee to publicly perform any 
of the musical works in a PRO’s catalog for a flat fee or a percentage of total revenues. Broadcast 
radio stations obtain blanket licenses from songwriters or publishers, which are negotiated on 
their behalf by the Radio Music License Committee (RMLC). In 2012, RMLC reached 
settlements with ASCAP and BMI on the amounts that radio stations pay to these two PROS for 
the use of music through the end of 2016.62 The settlements encompass the stations’ traditional 
radio broadcast service as well as their noninteractive streaming services. 
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, acting as the rate court, approved 
these settlements. After Pandora Media, Inc. filed a motion claiming that the ASCAP settlement 
with the RMLC violated the terms of the ASCAP antitrust consent decree, a judge ruled, and in 
May 2015 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, that Pandora Media, Inc. 
should pay ASCAP 1.85% of the revenues of its Pandora service.63 This is less than the 3% of 
revenues ASCAP originally demanded, but more than the 1.7% paid by radio broadcast stations 
and the online streaming services operated by broadcast radio groups. There are now several such 
services (see Table 2). In 2015, Pandora Media, Inc. completed the purchase of KXMZ-FM in 
Rapid City, SD, so it, too, could be covered by the terms of the RMLC settlements.64  
                                                 
61 2015 Copyright Office Report, p. 33. 
62 Radio Music License Committee, “Federal Court Approves Radio Industry Settlement with ASCAP,” press release, 
January 27, 2012, http://www.radiomlc.org/pages/4795848.php; Radio Music License Committee, “Federal Court 
Approves Radio Industry Settlement with BMI,” press release, August 12, 2012, http://www.radiomlc.org/pages/
6282052.php. See also David Oxenford, “Details of the ASCAP Settlement with the Radio Industry—What Will Your 
Station Pay?,” Broadcast Law Blog, January 30, 2012, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2012/01/articles/details-of-
the-ascap-settlement-with-the-radio-industry-what-will-your-station-pay/. 
63 Ben Sisario, “Pandora Wins a Battle, but the War Over Royalties Continues,” New York Times, March 20, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/21/business/media/pandora-wins-a-battle-but-the-war-over-royalties-continues.html?
_r=0. Pandora Media, Inc. v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers et al, Nos. 14-1158, 14-1161, 
14-1246 (2nd Cir. May 6, 2015). Pandora is involved in a similar suit with BMI. Ed Christman, “Pandora Appeals BMI 
Rate Court Ruling,” Billboard, October 20, 2015, http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6737437/pandora-
appeals-ruling-bmi-royalty-rate. 
64 Andrew Flanagan, “FCC Sweeps Aside a Final Obstacle to Pandora’s Radio Station Buy,” Billboard, September 17, 
2015, http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6700463/fcc-ascap-pandora-radio-station-south-dakota. 
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Table 2. Online Radio Services Owned/Operated by 
Selected Broadcast Radio Groups 
Broadcast Radio Group 
Broadcast Radio 
Stations Owned and 
Operated Online Radio Service Notes 
iHeartMedia, Inc. 781 iHeart Radio  Free ad-supported service. 
Offers live streaming of 
broadcast radio stations and 
personalized stations, based on 
artist or genre. 
CBS Corporation 113 Last.fm Free ad-supported service. 
Offers live streaming of 
broadcast radio stations and 
personalized stations, based on 
artist or genre. 
Univision Communications 
Inc. 
60 Uforia Musica Free ad-supported service. 
Offers live streaming of 
broadcast radio stations and 
personalized stations, based on 
artist or genre. 
Pandora Media, Inc.a 1 Pandora (free) and 
Pandora One 
(subscription) 
Free ad-supported service; offers 
personalized stations, based on 
artist or genre. Premium tier 
service for $4.99 per month or 
$54.89 per year (ad-free, more 
skips, fewer timeouts, premium 
quality audio). 
Source: SNL Kagan; Robin Flynn et al., Economics of Internet Music and Radio, 2015 Edition; Pandora. 
a. In November 2015, Pandora Media, Inc. purchased the assets of the streaming media service Rdio, in which 
the radio broadcasting company Cumulus had a partial ownership interest. Pandora subsequently shut down 
the Rdio service.  
Current law, 17 U.S.C. Section 114(i), prohibits judges or other government officials from 
considering rates paid to record labels and artists for public performances of sound recordings 
when setting or adjusting public performance rates payable to music publishers and songwriters. 
This provision was included when Congress created a public performance right for sound 
recordings with the 1995 enactment of the DPRSRA. This provision may contribute to a disparity 
between the rates interactive services pay music publishers for performance rights, which cannot 
be tied to the prices they pay record labels, and the rates they pay music publishers for 
mechanical rights, which are tied to the rates they pay record labels.  
Figure 3 represents how the different sources of royalties contribute to music publishers’ 
revenues.65 
                                                 
65 Figures reported from the National Music Publishers Association (NMPA) for its members are lower than those 
reported by the research firm IBIS. NMPA reported that in 2014 its member organizations received a total of $2.1 
billion in U.S. revenues, a decline from the $2.2 billion generated in 2013. Ed Christman, “Music Publishing Leader 
Says Revenues Down, Looks to Apple Music for Hope,” Billboard, June 17, 2015,  
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Figure 3. Breakout of Music Publishers’ U.S. Revenues, by Type of Royalty 
 
Source: IBISWORLD.com, 2015 IBISWorld Music Publishing Report; 2014 IBISWorld Music Publishing Report; 
Broadcast Music, Inc., “Broadcast Music, Inc. Reports Record-Breaking Revenues of $977 Million,” press release, 
September 18, 2014, http://www.bmi.com/news/entry/
broadcast_music_inc._reports_record_breaking_revenues_of_977_million; American Society of Composers, 
Authors and Publishers, “ASCAP Is the First PRO in the World to Report $1 Billion in Revenues,” press release, 
March 13, 2015, http://www.ascap.com/press/2015/0302-ascap-hits-a-high-note-in-its-100th-year.aspx. 
Notes: Synchronization refers to the use of music incorporated in audiovisual works, such as movies, television 
programs, and video games. In 2014, songwriters, composers, and music publishers collectively received $840 
million from BMI and $883 million from ASCAP in performance royalties. Assuming standard contractual terms 
applied, publishers received about 50% of each distribution. 
Record Labels and Recording Artists 
Reproduction and Distribution Licenses  
Congress did not recognize sound recordings as a distinct class of copyrighted works until 1971, 
when it adopted the 1971 Sound Recording Amendment.66 This law granted sound recordings 
made after its effective date a reproduction right analogous to that provided for other works of 
authorship.67 The effective date of the Sound Recording Amendment was February 15, 1972, four 
months after Congress passed it. Today, copyright protection of pre-1972 sound recordings 
remains governed by a patchwork of state and common law.  
Recognizing that noninteractive digital services (including SiriusXM satellite service, Music 
Choice, and Pandora) may need to make ephemeral server reproductions of sound recordings, in 
1998 Congress established a related license under Section 112 of the Copyright Act specifically to 
authorize the creation of these copies. The rules governing licenses for temporary reproductions 
of sound recordings are somewhat analogous to those governing incidental reproduction and 
                                                 
66 P.L. 92-140. See also Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights and Director et al., Federal Copyright Protection for 
Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, U.S. Copyright Office, December 2011, http://copyright.gov/docs/sound/ (2011 Copyright 
Office Report). 
67 2011 Copyright Office Report. 
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distribution of musical works described in Section 115(c)(3)(C)(i).68 The rates and terms of the 
Section 112 license are established by the CRB. Through SoundExchange, described below in 
“Sound Recording Public Performance Royalties,” copyright owners of sound recordings (usually 
the record labels) receive Section 112 fees. Recording artists who do not own the copyrights, 
however, do not.69 
With the limited exception described above, Congress did not empower the government to 
oversee the rates that record labels and artists may charge for the mechanical rights to sound 
recordings (i.e., to manufacture and distribute CDs, sell digital downloads of music and ringtones, 
or operate an interactive music service). Instead, these rates are subject to private negotiations in 
the marketplace. 
Sound Recording Public Performance Royalties 
Noninteractive Services 
Until 1995, the Copyright Act did not afford public performance rights to record labels and 
recording artists for their sound recordings. Record labels and artists primarily earned income 
from reproduction and distribution royalties based on retail sales of physical products such as 
CDs. With the inception and public use of the Internet in the early 1990s, the recording industry 
became concerned that existing copyright law was insufficient to protect the industry from music 
piracy.70 Two amendments to the Copyright Act, the Digital Performance Rights in Sound 
Recordings Act (DPRSRA) in 1995 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998, 
addressed this concern.71 
In the DPRSRA, Congress granted record labels and recording artists an exclusive public 
performance right for their sound recordings, but limited this right to digital audio transmissions. 
Congress made noninteractive subscription services, specifically satellite and cable radio (Music 
Choice and Muzak) services, eligible for compulsory licensing under Section 114.72 The CRB 
applies the same four-factor policy-oriented standards described in Section 801(b)(1) of the 1976 
Copyright Act that have applied to music publishers’ licensing of mechanical rights. 
The DMCA expanded the statutory licensing provisions in Section 114 to cover noninteractive 
online radio services.73 The law set up a bifurcated system of rate-setting standards for the CRB: 
 Services that existed as of July 31, 1998, prior to the enactment of the DMCA 
(i.e., SiriusXM satellite service as well as the Music Choice and Muzak 
subscription services), remained subject to the Section 801(b)(1) standard. 
                                                 
68 17 U.S.C. §112(e)(1); U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 
committee print, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., October 8, 1998, H.Rept. 105-796, pp. 89-90. 
69 Copyright Office, Library of Congress, “Review of Copyright Royalty Judges Determination, Notice,” 73 Federal 
Register 9143, 9146, February 19, 2008. This is in contrast to 17 U.S.C. §114(g), which specifically allocates 45% of 
performance royalties to recording artists, even when they are not the copyright holders. 
70 Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 153 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 929 (2010). 
(“Launch Media”). 
71 Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, “Ch. 8.21 Digital Performance,” in Nimmer on Copyright: A Treatise on the 
Law of Literary, Musical, and Artistic Property, and the Protection of Ideas, vol. 2 (New York: M. Bender, 2015). 
72 17 U.S.C. §114(d)(2). 2015 Copyright Office Report, p. 49. 
73 P.L. 105-304. 
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 Online radio and other digital music services (including both subscription and 
advertising-supported music streaming services) that entered the music 
marketplace after July 31, 1998, are subject to rates and terms “that most clearly 
represent the rates and terms that would have been negotiated in the marketplace 
between a willing buyer and a willing seller.”74 
The CRB administers the ratemaking proceedings for (1) satellite radio and “preexisting” satellite 
subscription services (which it terms the “SDARS” rate proceedings) and (2) online radio and 
digital music services (which it terms the “Webcaster” or “Web” rate proceedings). 
SoundExchange also administers the Section 114 fees that noninteractive digital services pay 
record labels for public performance rights. The Copyright Act specifies how record labels and 
recording artists divide the public performances they receive from noninteractive digital music 
services via SoundExchange.75 
One challenge with the willing buyer/willing seller standard is, as Senator Patrick Leahy stated in 
2002, 
[that it] may have the may be having the unfortunate and unintended result that 
webcasters and copyright owners are concerned that the rates and terms of any voluntary 
licensing agreements will be applied industry-wide. The [willing buyer/willing seller] 
standard appears to be making all sides cautious and reluctant to enter into, rather than 
facilitating, voluntary licensing agreements.
76
 
As discussed in “CRB Rates for 2016-2020,” CRB’s use of privately negotiated agreements as 
benchmarks for setting industrywide rates has been controversial.  
Interactive Services 
The DPRSRA enabled owners of sound recordings (i.e., record labels and/or artists) to negotiate 
directly with interactive digital transmission services for public performance rights at 
marketplace-determined rates. The term “interactive service” covers only services in which an 
individual can arrange for the transmission or retransmission of a specific recording.77 
The Senate Judiciary Committee in 1995 explained that 
[C]ertain types of subscription and interactive audio services might adversely affect sales 
of sound recordings and erode copyright owners’ ability to control and be paid for use of 
their work.... Of all of the new forms of digital transmission services, interactive services 
are the most likely to have a significant impact on traditional record sales, and therefore 
pose the greatest threat to the livelihoods of those whose income depends on revenues 
derived from traditional record sales.
78
 
                                                 
74 17 U.S.C. §114(f)(2)(B). 
7517 U.S.C. §114(g). See also U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Digital Performance Right in Sound 
Recordings Act of 1995, committee print, 104th Cong., 1st sess., October 11, 1995, 104-274, pp. 23-24. “In the absence 
of the work made for hire doctrine of the copyright law, record companies ... are joint authors of a sound recording. 
However, the work made for hire doctrine often applies to sound recordings. Under this doctrine, upon creation of the 
sound recording, record companies ... are the sole rightsholders.... The Committee intends the language of section 
114(g) to ensure that a fair share of digital sound recordings goes to performers under the terms of their contracts.”  
76 Sen. Patrick Leahy, “Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002,” Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 148, part 2 
(November 20, 2002), p. S11727. 
77 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, 
committee print, 104th Cong., 1st sess., August 4, 1995, S.Rept. 104-128, p. 18. 
78 Ibid., pp. 14-16. 
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Thus, while Taylor Swift and her record label have the legal right to withdraw her catalog from an 
interactive service such as Spotify, they cannot, pursuant to the compulsory license exemptions 
set forth in Section 114, refuse to allow the use of her recordings by noninteractive services such 
as Pandora. Similarly, Adele is not immune from compulsory licensing, even though she 
reportedly did not wish to make her newest album, 25, available for streaming.79 
Broadcast Radio Exception 
Congress does not require broadcast radio stations to obtain public performance licenses from 
owners of sound recordings. The Senate Judiciary Committee explained in 1995 that it was 
attempting to strike a balance among many interested parties. Specifically, the committee stated: 
the sale of many sound recordings and the careers of many performers have benefitted 
considerably from airplay and other promotional activities provided by ... free over-the-
air broadcast ... [and] the radio industry has grown and prospered with the availability 
and use of prerecorded music. This legislation should do nothing to change or jeopardize 
[these industries’] mutually beneficial relationship.80 
The Senate Judiciary Committee further distinguished broadcast radio from other services by 
stating that “[F]ree over-the-air broadcasts ... provide a mix of entertainment and non-
entertainment programming and other public interest activities to local communities to fulfill a 
condition of the broadcasters’ licenses.”81 
In addition to maintaining that artists continue to benefit from the promotional value of broadcast 
radio airplay, broadcasters assert that a performance royalty fee would hurt them financially, and 
effectively force them to subsidize the recording industry.82 Representatives of recording artists 
and record labels argue that they are the ones subsidizing the broadcast radio industry, because 
they are prohibited from exercising their property rights.83 A 2010 report published by the 
Government Accountability Office “found the relationship between radio airplay and music sales 
to be unclear.”84 Pandora Media, Inc. claims that its advertising-supported service is similar to 
broadcast radio service, and that the requirement that it pay record labels and artists for each 
“stream,” while services owned by broadcast radio operators do not, represents an unfair legal 
disparity.85 
Members of the band Pink Floyd counter that in order to increase parity with broadcast radio, it 
would be more beneficial to artists if Congress were to require broadcast radio stations to pay 
royalties.86 The Copyright Office supports such a requirement, arguing that adding this 
                                                 
79 Jacob Kastrenakes, “Pandora is Streaming Adele’s 25 and Her Label Can’t Stop It,” The Verge, November 25, 2015, 
http://www.theverge.com/2015/11/25/9800508/25-streaming-pandora-radio-service-licensing. 
80 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, 
committee print, 104th Cong., 1st sess., August 4, 1995, S.Rept. 104-128, pp. 14-15. 
81 Ibid., p. 15. 
82 National Association of Broadcasters, “A Performance Tax Puts Local Jobs at Risk,” http://nab.org/advocacy/
issue.asp?id=1889&issueid=1002. 
83 Music First, The Truth About Performance Rights, http://musicfirstcoalition.org/performancerights. 
84 U.S. Government Accountability Office, The Proposed Performance Rights Act Would Result in Additional Costs for 
Broadcast Radio Stations and Additional Revenue for Record Companies, Musicians, and Performers, 10-826, August 
2010, p. 12, http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/308569.pdf. 
85 Tim Westergren, founder, Pandora, Pandora and Royalties (blog), June 26, 2013, http://blog.pandora.com/2013/06/
26/pandora-and-royalties/. 
86 Roger Waters, David Gilmour, and Nick Mason, “Pink Floyd: Pandora’s Internet Radio Ripoff,” USA Today, June 
25, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/06/23/pink-floyd-royalties-pandora-column/2447445/. 
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requirement would enable U.S. artists and record labels to collect performance royalties from 
foreign radio broadcasts. The Copyright Office states that most countries condition payment of 
such royalties on reciprocity. The National Association of Broadcasters contends that an 
expansion of performance rights will be insufficient to invoke copyright reciprocity from other 
nations.87 
For information about bills that would address this exception, see “Bills Introduced in the 114th 
Congress.” 
SoundExchange 
Congress intended the rate-setting process to permit voluntary industry agreements when 
possible. Congress provided antitrust exemptions to statutory licensees and copyright owners of 
sound recordings so that they could designate common agents to collectively negotiate with 
digital radio services and agree upon royalty rates for public performance rights.88 The Recording 
Industry Association of America (RIAA) established SoundExchange as a designated common 
agent for the record labels in 2000 and spun it off in 2003 as an independent entity. In 2015, 
SoundExchange reached agreements with public radio stations and college radio stations covering 
the rates paid to stream recordings online; the CRB approved the settlement agreements.89  
The Copyright Act does not include record producers in the statutorily defined split of royalties 
for public performances of sound recordings by digital noninteractive services. As a result, record 
producers must rely on contracts with one of the parties specified in the statute, often the featured 
recording artist, in order to receive royalties from digital performances.  
In general, the CRB has adopted “per‐performance” rates for public performances of sound 
recordings for digital music services, rather than the percentage‐of‐revenue rates typically 
charged by PROs to license public performances of musical works.90
 
That per‐performance 
approach has proven controversial.91  
Webcaster Settlement Acts 
Following complaints by some online streaming services and radio broadcasters that the per‐
performance rates ordered by the CRB were excessive, Congress has repeatedly passed 
legislation (collectively, the “Webcaster Settlement Acts”) giving SoundExchange temporary 
authority to negotiate alternative royalty schemes binding on all copyright owners in lieu of the 
                                                 
87 2015 Copyright Office Report, pp. 89-90. 
88 17 U.S.C. §112(e)(2), 114(e)(1), 115(c)(3)(B). 
89 Copyright Royalty Board, Library of Congress, “Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral 
Recordings,” 80 Federal Register 59588, October 2, 2015. Library of Congress, Copyright Royalty Board, “Digital 
Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings,” 80 Federal Register 58201, September 28, 2015. 
17 U.S.C. §801(b)(7)(A) codifies the CRB’s authority to do so. 
90 “A key reason for rejecting the percentage-of-revenue approach was the Panel’s determination that a per performance 
fee is directly tied to the right being licensed. The Panel also found that it was difficult to establish the proper 
percentage because business models varied widely in the industry, such that some services made extensive music 
offerings while others made minimal use of the sound recordings. The final reason and perhaps the most critical one for 
rejecting this model was the fact that many webcasters generate little revenue under their current business models. As 
the Panel noted, copyright owners should not be ‘forced to allow extensive use of their property with little or no 
compensation.’” Copyright Office, Library of Congress, “Determination of Reasonable Rates, Final Rule and Order,” 
67 Federal Register 45240, 45249, July 8, 2002. 
91 2015 Copyright Office Report, pp. 51-52. 
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CRB‐set rates.92 The most recent agreements reached under SoundExchange’s authority to do this 
expired at the end of 2015, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §114(f)(5)(A).  
The Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 (“2008 WSA”) gave SoundExchange temporary authority 
(which expired on February 15, 2009), to negotiate directly with services that stream music over 
the Internet (“webcasters”). The law prohibited the agreements from extending beyond December 
31, 2015. Broadcast radio stations that stream their stations over the Internet (represented by the 
National Association of Broadcasters) and “small webcasters” reached privately negotiated 
agreements with SoundExchange at the deadline.93 Small webcasters transmitting less than 5 
million hours of music programming per month could pay the greater of 
1. 10% of the small webcaster’s first $250,000 gross revenues, and 12% of gross 
revenues in excess of $250,000 during the applicable year, or 
2. 7% of the small webcaster’s expenses during the applicable year.94 
The Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009 (“2009 WSA”) reinstated SoundExchange’s authority to 
negotiate settlement agreements for a 30-day period starting on July 1, 2009. SoundExchange 
reached agreements with several digital music services prior to the deadline. This settlement is 
commonly known as the “Pureplay Settlement.” Any qualifying noninteractive streaming service 
(webcaster) could avail itself of the rates and terms of the agreement by filing an initial notice of 
election with SoundExchange, followed by annual notices, through 2015. Pandora chose this 
option.95 Pandora agreed to pay the greater of 25% of the service’s gross revenues or $0.14 per 
100 streams. Had Pandora not selected this option, it would have paid the CRB default rate of 
$0.23 per 100 streams.  
iHeart Media, Inc. and Pandora Media, Inc. subsequently reached directly negotiated licensing 
agreements with individual labels (direct agreements) rather than with SoundExchange. In 2012, 
iHeart Radio’s parent company, then known as Clear Channel, reached an agreement with Big 
Machine Label Group whereby it would pay performance rights for performances on its broadcast 
radio stations as well as its streaming services.96 In 2013, Clear Channel struck an agreement with 
Warner Music Group that also included fees for performances on all of Clear Channel’s assets, 
including broadcast radio stations.97 In 2014, Pandora Media, Inc. reached an agreement with 
                                                 
92 P.L. 110-435. See also CRS Report RL34020, Statutory Royalty Rates for Digital Performance of Sound Recordings: 
Decision of the Copyright Royalty Board, by Brian T. Yeh. Previously Congress had passed the Small Webcaster 
Settlement Act of 2002, P.L. 107-321; the Webcaster Settlement Act (WSA) of 2008, P.L. 110-435, and the Webcaster 
Settlement Act of 2009, P.L. 111-36. The 2009 WSA extended the window of time during which parties were 
authorized to reach settlements under the 2008 WSA. 
93 Library of Congress, U.S. Copyright Office, “Notification of Agreements Under the Webcaster Settlement Act of 
2008,” 74 Federal Register 9293, March 3, 2009, The group of “small webcasters” that reached the agreement included 
Attention Span Radio; Blogmusik (Deezer.com); Born Again Radio; Christmas Music 24/7; Club 80’s Internet Radio; 
Dark Horse Productions; Edgewater Radio; Forever Cool (Forevercool.us); Indiwaves (Set YourMusicFree.com); 
Lundlow Media (MandarinRadio.com); Musical Justice; My Jazz Network; PartiRadio; Playa Cofi Jukebox 
(Tropicalglen.com); Soulsville Online; taintradio; Voice of Country; and Window to the World Communications 
(WFMT.com). Ibid., p. 9294, n. 1. 
94 Ibid., p. 9303. 
95 Pandora Media, Inc., SEC Form 10-K, for the fiscal year ended January 31, 2013, p. 9. 
96 Clear Channel Media and Entertainment, “Big Machine Label Group and Clear Channel Announce Groundbreaking 
Agreement to Enable Record Company and Its Artists to Participate in All Radio Revenue Streams and Accelerate 
Growth of Digital Radio,” press release, June 5, 2012, http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120605005867/en/
Big-Machine-Label-Group-Clear-Channel-Announce#.VRxaMuHQJUE. In 2014 Clear Channel renamed itself 
iHeartMedia.  
97 Clear Channel Media and Entertainment, “Warner Music Group and Clear Channel Announce Landmark Music 
(continued...) 
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Merlin, a coalition representing independent labels, in which Pandora agreed to “steer” listeners 
of its online service toward Merlin-label recordings in exchange for discounted rates.98  
CRB Rates for 2016-2020 
In April 2015, the CRB began the hearing phase of its proceeding to set the royalty rates paid by 
noninteractive digital music services to SoundExchange for the years 2016-2020.99 17 U.S.C. 
Section 114(f)(5)(C) barred the CRB from taking into consideration the provisions of the 
Pureplay Settlement. During the CRB’s rate proceeding, questions arose about the proper 
interpretation of this provision. Pandora Media, Inc., Clear Channel, and SoundExchange 
disagreed over whether the direct agreements, which were based in part on the Pureplay 
settlement, could be introduced as evidence in the CRB rate proceeding. SoundExchange argued 
that Congress enacted a “very broad rule of exclusion” to prevent the terms of a WSA agreement 
from being used against a settling party in subsequent proceedings. Pandora Media, Inc. and 
Clear Channel contended that SoundExchange’s interpretation would require disregarding every 
benchmark agreement proposed by parties, as all agreements are to some degree impacted by the 
prevailing rates and terms negotiated pursuant to the 2009 WSA.100 The CRB determined that 
these questions were novel material questions of substantive law and, as required by the 
Copyright Act, referred them to the Register of Copyrights for resolution.101 In September 2015, 
the Register ruled that the CRB may consider directly negotiated licenses that incorporate or 
otherwise reflect provisions in a WSA agreement.102 
On December 16, 2015, the CRB issued its decision regarding rates for the 2016-2020 period.103 
For 2016, streaming services (including those of broadcast radio stations as well as Pandora) must 
pay $0.17 per 100 streams on nonsubscription services.104 In a break from its past practice of 
setting rate increases in advance, CRB tied the annual rate increases from 2017 through 2020 to 
the Consumer Price Index. 
                                                                
(...continued) 
Partnership,” press release, September 12, 2013, http://www.iheartmedia.com/pages/Warner-Music-Group-and-Clear-
Channel-Announce-Landmark-Music-Partnership.aspx. 
98 Brad Hill, “Pandora Proposes Lowering Music Royalty Rates Based on ‘Steering’ in Merlin Agreement,” Radio and 
Internet News, October 27, 2014, http://rainnews.com/pandora-proposes-lowered-music-royalty-rates-based-steering-
merlin-agreement/. 
99 David Oxenford, “Copyright Royalty Board Begins Hearings on Webcasting Royalty Rates for 2016-2020—When 
Will We See a Decision?,” Broadcast Law Blog, April 29, 2015, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2015/04/articles/
copyright-royalty-board-begins-hearings-on-webcasting-royalty-rates-for-201-2020-when-will-we-see-a-decision/. 
100 Maria A. Pallante, Register of the Copyrights and Director, Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for 
Ephemeral Recordings and Webcasting Digital Performance of Sound Recordings (Web IV), U.S. Copyright Office, 
Library of Congress, Memorandum Opinion on Novel Material Questions of Law, September 18, 2015, p. 5, 8, 
http://www.loc.gov/crb/web-iv/memorandum-opinion-%20on-novel-material-questions-of-law.pdf. (2015 Copyright 
Office Web IV Memo) 
101 17 U.S.C. §802(f)(1)(b). 
102 2015 Copyright Office Web IV Memo, p. 10. 
103 Copyright Royalty Board, Web IV Determination, Exhibit A, December 16, 2015, http://www.loc.gov/crb/web-iv/
web-iv-terms.pdf. The CRB subsequently amended the regulatory language codifying the terms of the decision. 
Copyright Royalty Board, Web IV Determination, Exhibit A, December 24, 2015, http://www.loc.gov/crb/web-iv/
amended-web-iv-terms.pdf.  
104 Although the award is more than the $0.11 per 100 streams on its free service sought by Pandora, it is less than the 
$0.25 per 100 streams or 55% of Pandora’s revenue, whichever was greater, sought by SoundExchange. In 2015, 
pursuant to the agreement it had reached with SoundExchange, Pandora paid the greater of $0.14 per 100 streams on 
free service or 25% of its revenue. 
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Rather than setting forth ephemeral recording fees separately, the CRB includes them with the 
Section 114 royalties. For the 2016-2020 period, the CRB set ephemeral royalties fees at 5% of 
the total Section 114 royalties paid by streaming services. 
For nonsubscription services such as Pandora, the CRB reduced the per-performance rate it set in 
the previous rate proceeding: the 2016 per performance rate is $0.17 per 100 streams, while the 
2015 per performance rates was $0.23 per 100 streams.105 Several music streaming services, 
including Pandora, welcomed the ruling,106 but others did not. Some “small” online music 
services may face increased royalty rates of 8 to 14 times what they had paid previously.107 
Advocates representing the small webcasters have launched a campaign to petition Congress to 
make the 2008 WSA agreement permanent or discontinue the sound recording performance 
royalties altogether for small online services.108 Without such an action, the advocates claim, 
small webcasters may go out of business. 
In addition, SoundExchange objected that the rates set by the CRB do not provide adequate 
compensation to performers and record labels. It asserted that the rates did not reflect the market 
price of music and were unfair to artists and record labels.109 
The Copyright Act specifies how royalties collected under Section 114 are to be distributed: 50% 
goes to the copyright owner of the sound recording, typically a record label; 45% goes to the 
featured recording artist or artists; 2½% goes to an agent representing nonfeatured musicians who 
perform on sound recordings; and 2½% goes to an agent representing nonfeatured vocalists who 
perform on sound recordings.110 Prior to distributing royalty payments, SoundExchange deducts 
costs incurred in carrying out its responsibilities. In 2014, SoundExchange collected a total of 
$773 million in statutory royalties, compared with $20 million in 2005 and $462 million in 
2012.111 According to SoundExchange “this tremendous growth suggests that digital radio has 
become the fastest-growing segment of music consumption.” Table 3 describes how public 
performance rates vary, depending on the type of music service and when it began operating. 
                                                 
105 Library of Congress, Copyright Royalty Board, “Determination of Royalty Rates for Digital Performance Right in 
Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Final Rule and Order” 79 Federal Register 23102, April 25, 2014. The 
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3d 1332 (D.C. 2012), cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 2735 (2013). 
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Warren’s Washington Internet Daily, December 18, 2015. 
107 Brad Hill, “CRB: Small Webcasters Face January 1 with Fear, Anger, Hope, and Strategies,” RAIN News, December 
28, 2015, http://rainnews.com/crb-small-webcasters-face-january-1-with-fear-anger-hope-and-strategies/. 
108 Savenetradio 3.0, “Save Net Radio! We Need Your Help to Petition Congress. 100,000+ Stations Will Perish” 
https://www.change.org/p/u-s-house-of-representatives-u-s-senate-save-net-radio-we-need-your-help-to-petition-
congress-100-000-stations-will-perish. 
109 SoundExchange, “SoundExchange Statement on Web IV Rate Decision,” press release, December 16, 2015, 
http://www.soundexchange.com/pr/soundexchange-statement-on-web-iv-rate-decision/. 
110 17 U.S.C. §114(g)(2). See also SoundExchange, Artist & Copyright Owner: About Digital Royalties, 
http://www.soundexchange.com/artist-copyright-owner/digital-royalties/. 
111 SoundExchange, SoundExchange Annual Report for 2014 Provided Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §370.5(c), March 31, 
2015, http://www.soundexchange.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/2014-SoundExchange-Fiscal-Report-_FINAL-
REPORT_ISSUED_3-31-2015.pdf; Digital Radio Report, Q4 2014, http://digitalradioreport2014q4.
soundexchange.com/. 
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Table 3. Royalty Rates Payable to Record Labels for Public Performance Rights 
Applies to Selected Digital Noninteractive Music Services 
Music Service Type Fees 
Price per 
Performance  Notes 
Preexisting 
subscription service as 
of July 31, 1998 (Music 
Choice, Muzak) 
8% of monthly gross 
revenue 2013; 8.5% 
monthly gross 
revenue 2014-2017 
Not applicable Rate set by CRB based on 17 U.S.C. 
§801(b)(1) factors.  
Preexisting satellite 
digital audio radio 
service as of July 31, 
1998 (SiriusXM) 
9% of gross revenues 
in 2013; increasing by 
0.5% annually until 
11% in 2017 
Not applicable Rate set by CRB based on 17 U.S.C. 
§801(b)(1) rate standards. 
Licensed AM or FM 
broadcast radio 
stations that simulcast 
their terrestrial 
programming (e.g., via 
Radio.com; or iHeart 
Radio Live radio 
service; or channels 
broadcast with HD 
radio digital 
technology) 
Annual minimum fee: 
$500 per station or 
channel; maximum of 
$50,000 per year. 
CBS will base royalty 
fees increases 
between 2017-2020 
on CPI 
$0.17 per 100 
streams for 
nonsubscription 
services; $0.22 per 
100 streams for 
subscription 
services 
Royalties for 
ephemeral 
recordings = 5% of 
total fee payable 
Rate set by CRB based on willing 
seller/willing buyer standard.  
Pursuant to 2008 WSA, NAB had reached 
a separate agreement with 
SoundExchange, which was effective 
through 2015.a 2015 rate was $0.25 per 
100 streams. 
Webcasters (iHeart 
Radio and Pandora) 
Same as above Same as above Pursuant to 2009 WSA, Pandora opted in 
to the PurePlay settlement with Sound 
Exchange, which was effective through 
2015.b 2015 rate for services earning 
more than $1.25 million annual revenue 
was greater of $0.14 per 100 streams or 
25% of total annual gross revenues. 
“Small” Webcasters 
(defined by total 
amount of music 
programming hours 
transmitted to 
listeners)c 
Same as above Same as above Pursuant to 2008 WSA, several “small” 
webcasters reached a separate agreement 
with SoundExchange.a 2015 rates for 
services offering less than 5 million hours 
of music programming monthly were the 
greater of (a) 10% of first $250,000 annual 
revenues or 12% of revenues in excess of 
$250,000, or (b) 7% of webcaster’s annual 
expense. Other services subject to CRB 
rates. 
Source: Music Choice v. Copyright Royalty Board, 774 F. 3d 1000 (District of Columbia 2014). SoundExchange, 
http://www.soundexchange.com/service-provider/rates/, http://www.soundexchange.com/artist-copyright-owner/
digital-royalties/, http://www.soundexchange.com/service-provider/commercial-webcaster/; Radio.com, Listen Live, 
http://radio.com/ http://www.iheart.com/live/country/US/city/new-york-ny-159/; Kevin Goldberg, Library of 
Congress, Copyright Office, “Notification of Agreements Under the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009,” 74 
Federal Register 40614, August 12, 2009, Appendix A (Agreement with Sirius XM Radio Inc.). 37 C.F.R. §382.  
a. Library of Congress, Copyright Office, “Notification of Agreements Under the Webcaster Settlement Act 
of 2008,” 74 Federal Register 9293, Appendix B, March 3, 2009. 
b. Library of Congress, Copyright Office, “Notification of Agreements Under the Webcaster Settlement Act 
of 2009,” 74 Federal Register 34796, Appendix A, July 9, 2009. Pandora Media, Inc., SEC Form 10-K, for the 
fiscal year ended January 31, 2013, p. 9. 
c. The formal definition of “aggregate tuning hours” is available at 37 C.F.R. §280.2.  
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Industry Developments and Issues 
“Interactive” Versus “Noninteractive” Music Services 
The distinction between interactive and noninteractive services has been a matter of debate.112 For 
the purposes of defining the process by which owners of sound recordings can set rates for public 
performance rights, 17 U.S.C. §114 provides that an interactive service is one that enables a 
member of the public to receive either “a transmission of a program specially created for the 
recipient,” or, “on request, a transmission of a particular sound recording, whether or not as part 
of a program, which is selected by or on behalf of the recipient.”113 As discussed in 
“Reproduction and Distribution Licenses (Mechanical Licenses),” 17 U.S.C. Section 115 does not 
distinguish between interactive and noninteractive services for the purposes of specifying when a 
digital service must obtain mechanical rights from music publishers. The CRB has adopted these 
distinctions in setting or approving rates for mechanical licenses.114 
In 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that a custom radio service—one 
that relies on user feedback to play a personalized selection of songs that are within a particular 
genre or similar to a particular song or artist the user selects—is not an “interactive” service.115 
Noting that Congress’s original intent in making the distinction was to protect sound recording 
copyright holders from cannibalization of their record sales, the court’s decision rested on the 
following analysis: 
If a user has sufficient control over an interactive service such that she can predict the 
songs she will hear, much as she would if she owned the music herself and could play 
each song at will, she will have no need to purchase the music she wishes to hear. 
Therefore, part and parcel of the concern about a diminution in record sales is the concern 
that an interactive service provides a degree of predictability—based on choices made by 
the user—that approximates the predictability the music listener seeks when purchasing 
music.
116
 
The court noted that the LAUNCHcast online radio service offered by the defendant, Launch 
Media, Inc., which at the time was owned by Yahoo!, Inc., created unique playlists for each of its 
users.117 Nevertheless, the court reasoned that uniquely created playlists do not ensure 
predictability. Therefore, the court determined, LAUNCHcast was a noninteractive service.118 
In addition, in order to be eligible for compulsory licensing, noninteractive services (other than 
broadcast radio, SiriusXM, Music Choice, and Muzak) must limit the features they offer 
                                                 
112 2015 Copyright Office Report, pp. 48-49. 
113 17 U.S.C. §114(j)(7). 
114 The Copyright Office has stated, however, that it “would not dispute a finding [from the CRB] that non-interactive 
and interactive streams have different economic value, or even that a rate of zero might be appropriate for [digital 
phonorecord deliveries] made in the course of non-interactive streams.” Library of Congress, Copyright Royalty Board, 
“Adjustment of Determination of Compulsory License Rates for Mechanical and Digital Phonorecords,” 78 Federal 
Register 63798, 63941, n.14, November 13, 2013. 
115 Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 153 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 929 (2010). 
116 Ibid., p. 164. 
117 LAUNCHcast subsequently ceased operations. 
118 Ibid., pp. 161-162, 164. “LAUNCHcast listeners do not even enjoy the limited predictability that once graced the 
AM airwaves on weekends in America when ‘special requests’ represented love-struck adolescents’ attempts to 
communicate their feelings to ‘that special friend.’” 
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consumers, pursuant to the Copyright Act. For example, these services are prohibited from 
announcing in advance when they will play a specific song, album, or artist.119 Another example 
is the “sound recording performance complement,” which limits the number of tracks from a 
single album or by a particular artist that a service may play during a three‐hour period.120 
Free Versus Subscription Services and Sales of Music Downloads 
The Launch Media decision affirmed that personalized music streaming services such as Pandora 
and iHeartRadio could obtain statutory licenses as noninteractive services for their public 
performances of sound recordings.121 The CRB‐established rates do not currently distinguish 
between such customized services and other services that simply transmit undifferentiated, radio‐
style programming over the Internet. Because broadcast radio stations do not pay performance 
fees for over-the-air broadcasts, overall the royalties paid by companies that own several 
broadcast radio stations may be lower than those such as Pandora Media, Inc., which only owns 
one. (See “CRB Rates for 2016-2020.”) 
Spotify’s services, on the other hand, allow users access to specific albums, songs, and artists on 
demand. For no charge, consumers can have limited access to songs if they use the site on their 
personal computers and see or hear an advertisement every few songs. In exchange for paying a 
monthly fee of about $10 per month, users can listen to songs without advertisement interruption, 
use Spotify on mobile devices as well as personal computers, or listen to music offline. Spotify 
also offers exclusive track-by-track commentaries by artists on select albums.122 
The songwriter and artist Jay Z operates, among other divisions, a record label and music 
publishing company through his company, Roc Nation. On March 30, 2015, he announced, 
together with 15 other musicians, the launch of a new music subscription service called 
TIDAL.123 TIDAL offers two subscription levels: $9.99 per month for standard music quality and 
$19.99 per month for music with a higher-quality sound.124 Artists on TIDAL will offer windows 
of limited exclusive access to their music. TIDAL has not revealed specifics about how the 
service will pay its owners or participating artists, except that it will pay more to artists than free 
advertising-supported services.125 
In June 2015, Apple launched a new subscription service called Apple Music.126 After a three-
month free trial, users can pay a monthly fee of $9.99 (or $14.99 for a family subscription of up 
to six people) to access Apple’s library of 30 million songs, recommended music curated to their 
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tastes (by people rather than algorithms), and connect with artists through social networking 
features.127 Initially, Apple did not intend to compensate artists during the three-month free trial. 
After Taylor Swift publicly requested that Apple change its policy, Apple reversed course.128 In 
December 2015, Ms. Swift and Apple announced that Apple Music would be the exclusive outlet 
for her 1989 World Tour LIVE Concert Film beginning December 20, 2015.129 
Division of Royalty Payments 
Noncash types of consideration may be involved as the price interactive services pay for access to 
music. For example, the major labels acquired a reported combined 18% equity stake in Spotify 
in a transaction that reportedly hinged on their willingness to grant Spotify rights to use their 
sound recordings on its service.130 The record labels have also reportedly bought minority stakes 
in the music streaming service TIDAL.131 
As described in “Reproduction and Distribution Licenses (Mechanical Licenses),” the rates that 
interactive services pay are tied to the rates that the services pay record labels for mechanical 
rights, which are negotiated in the free market. This means that if a record label’s deal includes an 
equity stake in an interactive digital music service provider or a guaranteed allotment of 
advertising revenues, those items are assigned a value when estimating the total cost, thereby 
enabling music publishers to participate in such deals when negotiating for mechanical 
royalties.132 
The Copyright Office recommends that Congress require greater transparency regarding how 
such equity deals are reported to songwriters and artists, and how such deals impact royalty 
distribution. Organizations representing songwriters and recording artists have expressed concern 
that payments received by music publishers and record labels from digital music services as part 
of direct deals are not being shared fairly, potentially resulting in lower payments than they might 
receive under statutory licensing schemes.133 
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Policy Developments and Issues 
ASCAP and BMI Consent Decree Reviews 
Together, ASCAP and BMI, which operate on a not-for-profit basis, represent about 90% of songs 
available for licensing in the United States.134 SESAC appears to have about a 5% share of songs, 
but it may be higher. GMR, established in 2013, handles performance rights licensing for a 
limited number of songwriters.135 When ASCAP and BMI originally formed (in 1914 and 1939, 
respectively), they acquired the exclusive right to negotiate on behalf of their members (music 
publishers and songwriters) and forbade members from entering into direct licensing 
agreements.136 Both offered music services only blanket licenses covering all songs in their 
respective catalogs. 
In the 1930s, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division investigated ASCAP for 
anticompetitive conduct—specifically, whether ASCAP’s licensing arrangements constituted 
price‐fixing and/or unlawful tying.
 
The government subsequently filed federal court actions, 
arguing that the exclusive blanket license—as the only license offered at the time—was an 
unlawful restraint of trade, and that ASCAP was charging arbitrary prices. It pursued antitrust 
claims against BMI as well. The government settled with both ASCAP and BMI by entering into 
consent decrees in 1941. 
Since entering into these consent decrees, the Antitrust Division has periodically reviewed their 
operation and effectiveness. The ASCAP consent decree was last amended in 2001, and the BMI 
consent decree was last amended in 1994. 
Although the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees are not identical, they share many of the same 
features. Among those features are requirements that the PROs may acquire only nonexclusive 
rights to license members’ public performance rights; must grant a license to any user that applies 
on terms that do not discriminate against similarly situated licensees; and must accept any 
songwriter or music publisher that applies to be a member, as long as the writer or publisher 
meets certain minimum standards. ASCAP and BMI are also required to offer alternative licenses 
to the blanket license. Prospective licensees that are unable to agree to a royalty rate with ASCAP 
or BMI may seek a determination of a reasonable license fee from one of two federal district 
court judges in the Southern District of New York. 
Publishers allege that they are not receiving a fair share of the performance royalty revenues from 
streaming services, pointing to a 12-to-one royalty ratio weighted toward record labels and artists 
over songwriters and publishers.137 For example, Pandora Media, Inc. reported that in 2014, it 
paid 44% of its total revenues of $921 million to license sound recordings but 4% of its revenues 
to license musical works.138 Beginning in 2011, publishers began pressuring ASCAP and BMI to 
allow them to withdraw their digital rights from their blanket licenses so that they could negotiate 
direct deals with digital services.139  
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In 2011 and 2013, respectively, ASCAP and BMI each responded by amending their rules to 
allow music publishers the right to license their public performance rights for “new media” 
uses—that is, both interactive and noninteractive digital streaming services, so they could 
negotiate with digital stream services at market prices in lieu of rates subject to oversight by the 
federal district court. As a result, Pandora Media, Inc.—faced with a potential loss of PRO 
licensing authority for the major publishers’ catalogs—proceeded to negotiate licenses directly 
with EMI Music Publishing Ltd., Sony/ATV, and Universal Music Publishing Group at rates that 
brought the publishers higher fees than they were receiving under the PRO system.140 Pandora 
Media, Inc., however, challenged the publishers’ partial withdrawal of rights before both the 
ASCAP and BMI rate courts in the Southern District of New York. In each case—though 
applying slightly differing logic—the court ruled that under the terms of the consent decrees, 
music publishers could not withdraw selected rights; rather, a publisher’s song catalog must be 
either “all in” or “all out” of the PRO.141 
The Antitrust Division announced in June 2014 that it would evaluate the consent decrees. It has 
solicited and received extensive public comments on whether and how to modify the consent 
decrees.142
 
Specifically, both ASCAP and BMI seek to modify the consent decrees to permit 
partial grants of rights, to replace the current rate-setting process with expedited arbitration, and 
to allow ASCAP and BMI to provide bundled licenses that include multiple rights (e.g., 
mechanical as well as public performance in musical works).
 
The DOJ has expressed its intent to 
“examine the operation and effectiveness of the Consent Decrees,” particularly in light of the 
changes in the way music has been delivered and consumed. 
Although publishers covered by the current consent decrees cannot withdraw licenses for musical 
works as long as they are members of BMI or ASCAP, they can strike separate performance 
rights agreements. In November 2015, Pandora Media, Inc. reached an agreement with 
Sony/ATV, and in December 2015 it reached an agreement with Warner/Chappell Music.143 The 
multi-year agreements enable the streaming service to hedge against the possibility that the DOJ 
will permit members of ASCAP and BMI to withdraw digital performance rights.144 
The fact that many songs have several writers, each with his/her own publisher, can make the 
acquisition of performance rights complex. Industry practice has been that each publisher licenses 
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only a portion of a song. For Spotify to include Ryan Adam’s recorded version of “Shake It Off” 
in its catalog, it needed to pay both BMI (which collects royalties on behalf of Taylor Swift) and 
ASCAP (collects royalties on behalf of co-writer Max Martin and Shellback). Taylor Swift’s 
publisher, Sony/ATV, and Max Martin and Shellback’s publisher, Kobalt, are members of both 
ASCAP and BMI.145 One alternative to this process would be “100% licensing,” in which any 
writer or rights holder of a musical work can issue a performance license without the consent of 
the other rights holders. Under 100% licensing, Pandora Media, Inc. might be able to obtain the 
performance rights to “Shake it Off” from ASCAP and pay Sony/ATV the compulsory rate set by 
the New York court rather than negotiating with Sony/ATV. Thus, 100% licensing would likely 
weaken music publishers’ negotiating leverage.146 
In December 2015, however, Pandora Media, Inc. reached separate direct multi-year licensing 
agreements with ASCAP and BMI for their combined catalogs of more than 20 million musical 
works. The terms are confidential. As part of the deal, Pandora agreed to withdraw its appeal of 
the 2015 order in the BMI rate case.147 
Bills Introduced in the 114th Congress 
Legislators have introduced several measures related to the music industry. 
In February 2015, Senators John Barrasso and Heidi Heitkamp introduced S.Con.Res. 4, and 
Representative Michael Conaway, along with dozens of cosponsors, introduced H.Con.Res. 17, 
supporting the Local Radio Freedom Act. The resolutions would direct Congress to refrain from 
imposing any new performance fee, tax, royalty, or other charge relating to the public 
performance of sound recordings on a local radio station for broadcasting sound recordings over 
the air, or on any business for such public performance of sound recordings. 
In March 2015, Representatives Joe Crowley and Tom Rooney introduced the Allocation for 
Music Producers Act (AMP Act), H.R. 1457, with support from the Recording Academy and 
SoundExchange. The AMP Act would grant producers the statutory right to seek payment of their 
royalties via a designated agent (such as SoundExchange) when they have a letter of direction 
from a featured artist. The bill has been referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. 
Also in March 2015, the Songwriter Equity Act of 2015 was introduced as S. 662 by Senator 
Orrin Hatch and H.R. 1283 by Representative Doug Collins. Among other provisions, the bills 
would require the CRB, when setting royalty rates under the compulsory license available for the 
reproduction and distribution of musical works, to establish rates and terms that most clearly 
represent the rates and terms that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a 
willing buyer and seller in lieu of the Section 801(b)(1) factors. Songwriters, publishers, and the 
Copyright Office support such a change.148  
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In April 2015, Representatives Jerrold Nadler, John Conyers Jr., Marsha Blackburn, and Ted 
Deutch introduced the Fair Play Fair Pay Act of 2015, H.R. 1733. The bill would adopt several of 
the Copyright Office’s proposals with respect to sound recording royalties. These provisions 
include (1) extending the public performance right in sound recordings to broadcast radio (with a 
cap on payments made by small broadcasters, public and educational radio, religious services, 
and incidental uses of music), (2) including sound recordings made prior to February 15, 1972, 
among the body of works requiring royalty payments under federal law (and continuing to rely on 
state law for copyright protection), and (3) directing the CRB to adopt a uniform market-based 
rate-setting standard for public performance rights for all types of radio services (i.e., eliminate 
the Section 801(b)(1) four factors test). In determining the rates, the CRB would have to consider 
whether the audio services would enhance or interfere with the copyright owner’s other sources 
of revenue. 
Also in April 2015, Representatives Marcia Blackburn and Anna Eshoo introduced H.R. 1999, the 
Protecting the Rights of Musicians Act (PRMA). The bill would amend the Communications Act 
of 1934 by prohibiting companies that own both broadcast television and broadcast radio stations 
from seeking retransmission consent payments from multichannel programming distributors (i.e., 
cable and satellite operators) unless their radio stations pay performance royalties for sound 
recordings.149  
As discussed in “Broadcast Radio Exception,” while music publishers and songwriters do receive 
a performance royalty for over-the-air radio broadcasts, record labels and artists do not. 
Therefore, if, Congress were to pass both the Fair Play Fair Pay Act and the Songwriter Equity 
Act, the New York district court could factor in performance royalties for over-the-air radio 
broadcasts paid to record labels and artists when setting rates payable to publishers and 
composers for licenses covered by BMI and ASCAP that remain subject to the consent decrees. 
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